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ABSTRACT 
The United Nations is expressing increasing concern about personal 
savings mobilisation in underdeveloped countries. Currently attention is 
focussed on Africa. The purpose of this paper is to try to analyse this 
concern and to place the question of personal savings mobilisation in a broader 
economic perspective. Four types of savings institution are discussed in 
some detail: commercial banks, Post Office Savings Banks, thrift and credit 
cooperative societies and savings banks proper. The author takes issue 
with the more common criticisms of commercial banks and Post Office Savings 
Banks as mobilisers of personal savings in Africa, She also argues that the 
potential importance of cooperative societies has been exaggerated. 
PERSONAL SAVINGS IN AFRICA: STRENGTHENING THE INSTITUTIONAL 
FRAMEWORK (COMMERCIAL BANKS, POST OFFICE SAVINGS BANKS, THRIFT 
AND CREDIT' COOPERATIVES AMD SAVINGS BANKS PROPER) 
We must distinguish economic surplus on the one hand from savings 
on the other in order to establish why and in what circumstances savings 
mobilisation is important for economic development. Potential economic 
surplus is 'the difference between the output that could be produced in 
a given natural and technological environment with the help of employable 
productive resources, and. what might be regarded as essential consumption" 
(Baran, 1957). There are various ways the surplus can be moblised. The 
main alternatives are 
1. Taxation 
2. Overseas borrowing 
3. deficit financing 
4. pricing policy (including use of state trading organizations) 
5. deposits in banks and other financial institutions 
6. sale of bonds and securities 
7. lotteries 
8. durect reubvestment by producers not using financial institutions 
9. group mobilisation of slack labour for labour-intensive capital 
formation 
10. other "self-help" projects 
11. state directed real location of private sector resources 
12. expropriation 
Of these alternatives 5, 6 and possibly 7 and 10 constitute the 
use of savings instruments. 
An issue any country must face if it wishes to raise capital 
accumulation is how to increase the productive mobilisation of its 
potentially available surplus. As a method the use of savings institutions 
has the political advantage that they represent a voluntaristic approach 
to mobilisation. They can, however, be costly to develop and the cost 
involved per unit saved is likely to vary between institutions. Also 
the scope for ensuring that mobilised savings are used to raise the 
value of future production varies between institutions and for savings 
institutions as a whole is far from complete. 
To state that there is a savings constraint to economic 
growth and/or poverty reduction is in the sense in which the term savings 
is used here (voluntary abstention from consumption out of income) to state 
- 11 - IDS/WP 323 
that all other opportunities for resource mobilisation have been exhausted 
or are politically unacceptable or cost more at the margin than mobilising 
additional savings. While it is important not to ignore alternative methods 
of resource mobilisation and the interrelationships between them the general 
issues involved will not be discussed further here. Where any of the above 
conditions hold, a choice must then be made between different methods of 
savings mobilisation. As already suggested there are a number of alternative 
institutions, securities and informal organisations that can be used to 
mobilise savings. These include: 
Commercial banks 
post office savings banks 
savings banks 
credit and savings cooperatives 
multi-purpose cooperatives 
building societies 
finance companies 
life insurance funds 
pension funds 
bonds, securities, commercial bills, Treasury bills 
lotteries indigenous voluntary savings organisations. 
All of these institutions accept personal savings, which 
are the subject of this paper. The case emphasising 
the mobilisation of personal savings in Africa rests primarily 
on the facts that 
1. total savings are low in comparison with industrially advanced 
countries 
2. only a small section of the economy, as compared with industrially 
advanced cpuntries, generates corporate savings. 
3. is part of personal savings tends to be hoarded. 
There are, however, limitations to surplus mobilisation for 
expanded production through personal savings facilities. These stem 
from the facts that 
1. higher income groups devote part of their surplus income to 
acquisition of existing fixed assets (land and urban property), luxury consumption 
and overseas assets. Development of more diverse financial institutions 
and assets may attract some of the resources that would finance these outlays 
in the form of deposits but othermeasures are required if a substantially 
larger share of this surplus is to be mobilised to expand the value of 
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domestic production (foreign exchange control, taxes on land and urban 
property or ceilings on individual ownership of such assets and widening of 
the scope for entry of domestic capital into productive accumulation. 
2. most personal incomes are low and absolute per capita savings 
availability from these incomes is low too. 
In deciding what institutions should be used to mobilise personal 
savings various criteria may be used. One is the general cost-effectiveness 
of institutions in generating and managing deposits. A second is the nature 
of the beneficiaries. A viable savings institution has two categories of 
beneficiaries: those who deposit their savings and those who obtain credit. 
While there may be overlap, this may be far from complete. (Shareholders may 
represent a third category.) Factors to be considered in dealing with these 
issues include: coverage, institution costs and user costs, direction of on-
lending, relationship between the terms offered by financial institutions and 
demanded by potential users and ease of coordination between institutions. 
Commercial Banks 
The commercial banks are the major institutional mobilizers of 
personal savings in Africa, but acceptance of personal savings is only part 
of their business: deposits come also from public bodies and private firms 
and loans and overdrafts are extended to both. For example, in Kenya in 
1974- total commercial bank deposits amounted to KX271 million of which K£48 
million were public sector deposits and the remaining K2.23 million came from 
private firms and individuals. By contrast deposits with the Kenyan Post Office 
Saving Bank amounted to £3 million (Kenya Government, 1975: 166, 168). These 
figures are illustrative of the relative scale of operation of the commercial 
banks and other savings banks throughout the continent. Fumess reports that 
in Nigeria in 1971 80 per cent of institutionalized savings were held in commercial 
banks, 17 per cent in the National Provident Fund and 1 per cent in the Post 
Office Savings Bank., (Furness, 1975: 61). 
The scale of operation of the banks and their relative success in 
attracting deposits obviously demands attention. The banks are in a position 
to play a significant role in economic development not only because they mobilise 
funds but because within limits they can also create money: a net expansion 
of commercial bank loans generates a net increase in bank deposits and total 
monetary purchasing power. How this purchasing power is used affects the 
development process. The total volume of credit extended by the commercial 
banks in a nationally autonomous banking system is limited by their holdings 
of notes , coin and other designated liquid assets , and these in turn depend 
partly on their ability to attract deposits. 
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Much has been written about commercial banking in developing countries 
(for the African experience see e.g. Jucker-Fleetwood, 1964, Newlyn 1967, 
Loxley 1973 and Furness, 1975). We shall concentrate here on the main features 
of the banks' operations as mobilisers of personal savings. 
The commercial banks accept three types of deposits: demand, 
savings and time. The first earns no interest and is repayable on demand; 
the second and third earn interest and notice is required before withdrawal. 
The banks do not want to serve the very small saver and have a minimum 
deposit requirement well above that of the Post Office Savings Banks and 
other institutions aiming to attract small savings. (Thus in Kenya the 
minimum commercial bank deposit is from shs. 300/- to shs. 500/- (Von Pischke, 
1972) whereas the minimum post office savings bank deposit is shs. 5/-.) 
The reason for the minimum deposit derives from the commercial banks' 
origins. From their development in the nineteenth century these have been 
profit-maximising institutions. The first commercial banks in Africa were 
all private expatriate banks. Even where the banks have since been nationalised 
they are still expected to make a profit within the limits imposed on their 
operations by central governments. Obviously therefore they continue to press 
for the maintenance of such traditions as the minimum deposit which they 
perceive as helping to achieve this aim (in this case through eliminating small 
scaLe uneconomic accounts whose processing costs are said to be greater than 
the revenue they can bring the banks). The prime purpose of the private 
sector banks is to maximise profits and not to serve all potential savers. 
The objective of the nationalised banks is some compromise between the two. 
By the time the commercial banks came to Africa they had overcome 
the difficulties arising from exce ssive competition for deposits and 
excessive readiness to lend funds which arose in the early decades of the 
nineteenth century. Banking traditions had been established which gave 
the commercial banks a reputation for reliability and this combined with 
"the sheer volume of their business helped them to inspire the necessary 
confidence to attract savers'' (United Nations Secretariat, 1975:7). 
Initially the deposits attracted in Africa came from import-export firms, 
colonial governments and mines and plantations. The banks continued to 
mobilise corporate and public sector deposits but from the outset they 
also accepted personal deposits and these also expanded steadily. The 
banks were based in a limited number of major commercial and administrative 
centres but their up-country branches have now expanded to the main centres 
of most districts (the "district headquarters" in British administrative-
jargon, which are usually the main trading centres for their areas). 
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Personal savings in commercial banks were initially almost totally expatriate. 
But as Africans achieved success in commerce, crop processing, transport and 
other economic activities and as some cf them obtained more senior jobs 
in the colonial administration so they also began to open bank accounts. After 
independence this trend accelerated partly because many governments started 
paying more salaries to African staff through the banks. Although this 
broadened the range of depositors by income classification the minimum 
deposit requirement was still retained;there was still no desire on the 
banks part to serve the really small saver. 
Obviously the commercial banks' preference for, and ability to 
attract, large and medium-size deposits essentially explains their relative im-
portance in the banking network as mobilisers of funds. As well as 
reliability the banks offer certain other advantages. These are-: 
1. ease of deposit and withdrawal 
2. interest payments on time and savings deposits at higher rates 
than those offered by Post Office Savings Banks. (The larger the deposit 
the greater the significance of interest differentials to the depositor.) 
3. possibility of obtaining a loan or overdraft 
4. attractiveness of savings accounts to many African depositors 
5. expanding up-country branches 
6. expanding national ownership. 
With regard to point 4 the figures are impressive. Hubner reports 
a considerable increase in savings deposits in Uganda in the 1960s and ascribes 
this to 
,:an enlarged income of this part of the population, coupled 
with a strongly pronounced prestige consciousness as well as : 
direct advertising by the banks ... (in addition) the tightening 
of exchange control in 1965, the efforts of the credit institutions 
to gain new clients by the extension of their branch networks ... 
(and) the introduction of the withdrawal of cheque facility, by . .. 
which the holders of savings accounts were allowed to effect up to 
75 cheque drawings per annum.''" (Hubner, 1973: 106). 
Furness also reports major increases in time and savings deposits: 324 per 
cent in Ethiopia from 1966 to 1973 (while the money supply only expanded 60 
per cent) and 319 per cent in Zambia over the same period. He explains 
this in terms of the lack of other financial institutions in many countries 
which make the commercial bank deposits the major alternative to hoarding 
particularly given the spread of branch banks (Furness, 1973: 119 and 130). 
Finally the following quotation reports a study of personal savings in 
medium and high income areas of Nairobi (Kenya). 
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"There are remarkable differences in the holding of financial 
assets. Savings accounts are by far the most prevalent method of 
saving among Africans. Some 55 per cent of those reporting changes 
in financial assets own savings accounts. Only 32 per cent of the 
Africans reported current accounts ownership. While a large 
proportion of Asians own savings accounts (69 per cent), this is not 
so striking as in the case of Africans since a high proportion of 
them - some 56 per cent - report ownership of current accounts, 
Europeans show a marked preference for current accounts over 
savings accounts. While only 20 per cent reported ownership 
of saving accounts, almost all (85 per cent) reported ownership 
of current accounts. 
There is a clear indication that ownership of saving accounts 
first increases with income and then declines. Some 4-9 per cent 
of the middle income Africans report ownership as compared with 
64 per cent of the high income Africans. In the case of Asians 
the ownership is reported by 90 per cent and^44 per cent of the 
middle and high income Asians respectively." (Kamau, 1973: 13), 
With regard to the sixth advantage (expanding national ownership), 
it is noteworthy that this has not only provided the opportunity to increasingly 
prevent the transfer to overseas metropolitan centres of commercial bank 
profits but also to expand the degree of government control over the activities 
of the banks with respect to promoting economic development. This may be 
done for example through requiring the further expansion of up-country branches 
or by directives with respect to the direction of lending (see United Nations 
Secretariat, 1975 and discussion below). 
As bank branches have increased the commercial banks have become 
more familiar as well as more accessible. They also accept deposits from 
savings organisations whose individual members cannot meet the minimum deposit 
requirement. Some of the banks also make a further contribution to 
savings mobilisation by providing arrangements for automatic monthly transfers 
from clients' current accounts to their savings accounts. For example in 
Uganda such a scheme has been operated by the Uganda Commercial Bank 
(Jellicoe, 1968: 18). 
Despite these changes the comercial banks have been subjected to 
strong criticism for failing to meet the development requirements of 
underdeveloped countries (e.g. United Nations Secretariat, 1975). 
(!)• "Middle income Africans are those with annual income of less than 
£1,000 - High income Africans are those with income of £1,000 and over. Middle 
income Asians are those whose income is less than £2,000. High income Asian 
have incomes of & ,000 and over." (Kamau, 1973: ibid.). 
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While clearly the operations of the Banks do have disadvantages so far 
as resource mobilisation is concerned, in my view some of this criticism 
is misplaced. Let us briefly consider this issue. The main disadvantages 
of the commercial banks with respect to personal savings mobilisation are 
the following: 
1. failure to mobilise small savings 
2. still relatively limited rural coverage 
3. failure in use of funds to meet the credit needs of the small farmer 
and businessman 
4. their predominantly short-term liabilities generally inhibit long-
term lending 
5. they provide credit partly for socially unproductive purposes. 
Certainly the commercial banks fail to mobilise really small-scale 
savings, although particularly in recent years inflation has eroded the 
real value of the minimum denosit. It is, however, unreasonable to make 
this criticism without consideration of its implications: what needs to be 
done to mobilise small-savings? Should the commercial banks in fact be 
expected to take these actions? We return to these issues below, in 
discussing the operations of these institutions specifically intended to 
serve the small saver where we also discuss the second and third disadvantages. 
l\je note here, however, that there appears to be a general consensus that 
the travelling branches introduced by some banks in the 1960s have not 
been very successful because rural people are distrustful of someone who 
takes their money and then drives away (Jellicoe, 1968; Hubner, 1973; 
Heyer, 1976)./ 
The fourth and fifth disadvantages, as well as the third, are linked 
to the fact that commercial banks (unlike the Post Office Savings Bank) 
provide credit: they not only mobilise savings but influence their use. 
They can exert this influence through the interrelated choices of borrower, 
purpose of loan and its duration and cost. The short-term nature of the 
commercial banks' liabilities combined with attempted profit maximisation 
explain why most commercial bank credit is short-term, (Interest rates 
are higher and it is easier to control repayments thus protecting liquidity). 
Their credit is often for financing movements of goods, inventories,, storage 
and in general seasonal shortfalls of revenue over expenditure. For example 
the crop marketing boards are major seasonal borrowers (Hunt 1975: Chapter 2). 
However they provide credit not only to large parastatals and private firms 
but to individual borrowers who may use this for a variety of purposes: for 
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establishment or operation of a small business, property purchase or 
development, school fees or consumption. Where borrowers prove reliable 
(or have exceptional influence) short-term credit may become medium-term 
through renewal of overdrafts. 
The banks have been criticised for being insufficiently adventurous 
in the use of their funds and for hence failing to contribute to economic 
development in a manner commensurate with the funds at their disposal 
(and in the manner expected by 
Schumpet er(1934) ), In order to establish whether this criticism is valid 
two separate issues must be considered 
a. are the banks fully lent (given their cash and liquid asset reserve 
requirements)? 
b. If they are fully lent what would be the economic impact of a shift 
in their lending pattern? 
Through much of Africa over the past two decades the commercial 
banks have apparently been fully lent (see e.g. Newlyn, 1967 on the East 
African banks; also, on Kenya, Nation Business Bureau, 1976: 9). The 
banks often could not autonomously expand total loans given the level of 
their reserves. They depended on increased government borrowing or 
foreign exchange inflows to enable them to do so. This is important: 
we can now elucidate the preceding criticism of the banks' operations. 
If the banks can only expand credit for productive investment by switching 
the direction of lending then effectively the banks' critics are arguing 
that the banks should use their powers to push up national savings and 
investment ratios. This makes sense in those countries where the banks have 
been nationalised; it makes less sense where they have not. Why should 
profit-making institutions in the private sector be expected to voluntarily 
take it upon themselves to deal with a problem that U.D.C. governments 
have found notoriously intractable: raising the savings rate? In practice 
both in industrially advanced c ountries and in U.D.C.s commercial banks only 
modify their profit maximising policies when directed to do so by national 
governments and/or under threat of nationalisation. If governments wish 
commercial banks to change their lending policies it is up to them to 
enforce this: private commercial banks are. not non-profit making or charitable 
institutions operating solely in the social interest. Governments can and 
do instruct commercial banks as to what their lending limits and priorities 
should be (see Nation Business Bureau, 1976, for a recent Kenyan 
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example"1'). Naturally even nationally owned banks protest when this 
lowers their nrofit margins. Some governments in Africa have shown greater 
determination to enforce such directives then others. (This applies also to 
more specialised banks. Thus in Tunisia in the late 1960s the Banque 
Nationals Agricole had to follow stringently enforced directives from the 
Central Bank with respect to the direction of new lending despite the 
strong disagreement of the director.) 
It is also important to note that in a monetary economy the items 
specified by the United Nations Secretariat (1975) as taking up most commercial 
bank loans (i.e. financing inventories, storage and movement of goods and 
seasonal shortfalls in revenue over expenditure) must be financed: 
There are definite limits to potential commercial bank loan switching 
from socially unproductive to socially productive uses. It is true, however, 
that the identification of the limits requires the collaboration of the 
(2) banks in the form of accurate reporting of loan use. 
There are limits to the effectiveness of moral suasion in influencing 
commercial bank lending. If governments wish to radically change the per-
formance of commercial banks then they must intervene directly. On the 
lending side to some extent this has been done. While there is scope 
for further elimination of unproductive lending the extent to which this 
can be achieved other than in a socialist state is questionable. 
(1) "The rate of expasion of credit to the private sector and public 
corporations is to be limited to 13 per cent a year - excluding the farming 
sector, loans to small African businessmen and the financing of exports. 
Of the three exceptions made, agriculture stands to gain most.Loans to 
the agricultural sector should be equal to 17 per cent of the net deposits 
of the commercial banks." (op.cit. : 9). 
(2), It is very odd that the Secretariat should refer to these uses as if 
they represented socially unproductive uses of credit because they do not 
finance fixed investment, since product movement and storage are necessary 
components of the social production process. Interestingly the rules of 
the Tanzanian N.D.C.A. specify that the types of activity for which credit 
is intended are 
"for agriculture, agricultured purposes and enterprises, for the 
marketing and processing of agricultural products, for the develop-
ment of storage and transport facilities and undertakings, for the 
development and. encouragement of small industries and trades 
and for the development of co-operative distribution services" 
(Tanzania Government, National Cooperative and Development Bank Act, 
1964, cited in Loxley, 1973.) 
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An important feature of the United Nations Secretariat's 1975 analysis 
of the commercial banks is the implication that if only they would lend 
long then this would lead to increased financing for socially desirable 
investments. But as the Secretariat half admits, this is far from the 
case, just as available statistics probably underestimate the extent to which 
the banks are in any case already financing medium to long term investments 
through renewable overdrafts and loans. For secure, profitable investment 
for the national economic elite in African countries often takes the form 
of land and property purchase and property construction. Where they can 
provide goc a security they can obtain commercial bank loans and overdrafts 
to finance such activities. Although there are certainly examples of medium 
and long-term indigenous investment in productive activity (in farming and, in 
rare cases, in manufacturing) the entree into manufacturing is for many extremely 
difficult due to the activities of the multi-nationals (to which the 
commercial banks of course extend credit). This raises much wider issues 
of national and international economic policy, pointing to the risk of 
deriving unrealistic and piecemeal solutions from analysing the activities 
of the commercial banks in isolation from their context. 
Post Office Savings Banks 
Over recent years the "poor performance" of Post Office Savings 
Banks in Africa has been the subject of comment (Jucker-Fleetwood, 1964; 
Furness 1975; see also United Nations Secretatiat, 1975). Thus, of 
Africa generally: 
"Little attempt was made to dynamize this institution, which 
soon suffered from a very high number of depositors with very small 
accounts." (Jucker-Fleetwood, 1964: 165). 
and 
'Disappointing, too, has been the performance of the Ghana 
Savings Bank (formerly the Post Office Savings Bank), which has 
failed to match the increasing competition of the commercial banks 
for small savings." (Furness, 1975: 68). 
Hubner writes of the Ugandan Post Office Savings Bank: 
"Since 1956, the development of deposits declined, although 
the number of accounts continually increased. At the end of 1967, 
the total deposits amounted to approximately £1.2 million, sub-
divided into 175,000 accounts. This declining development can 
mainly be traced to the expansionist policy of the credit institu-
tions , who are enlarging their branch network, allow a more generous 
disposition of credit balances, and, last but not least, offer more 
prestige and greater security". (Hubner, 1973: 106').. 
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Jucker-Fleetwood and Furness between them present.figures which show 
that in Nigeria from 1950 to 1970 there was some expansion followed by 
contraction in the activities of the Post Office Sayings Bank. From 1950 
to 1960 deposits rose from £2.8 million to £3.1 million v/hile the mean size 
of deposits fell from £16.7 to £12.9 (Jucker-Fleetwood, 1964: 165). By 1971 
total dtiposits had fallen to just over £2 million representing 1 per cent 
of institutionalized savings (Furness, 1975: 60, 61). 
The United Nations Secretariat in 1975 offered the following ex-
planation for this phenomenon. 
' A major factor that li.mits the affectivess of post offices 
as channels for the collection of personal savings concerns the 
use made of the funds thus collected. The fact that those funds 
,, flow ... to the Treasury constitutes the strength but also the 
limitation of the postal savings system ... . The post office 
banks appear to potential and actual depositors as institutions 
that put their savings to uses that remain mysterious to them and 
do net give the saver the possibility of receiving a loan in 
* case of need." (United Nations Secretariat, 1975: 139) 
The Secretariat goes on to recommend that savings banks generally should 
provide small and medium-scale credit to their clients. 
"The policy of allowing savings banks to grant loans- to individuals 
farms, small businesses and local authorities has a number of 
advantages from the standpoint of savings mobilisation and community 
development. First people are more likely to save .if they know 
that the savings institution can give them a loan which, added 
to their savings, will enable them to undertake a constructive 
project such as starting a business, building a house or financing 
the education of their children. Second, saving is encouraged 
when actual and potential savers know that the savings institution 
uses the funds for projects which benefit the immediate community • ' • • 
rather than transmitting them to a distant central government where 
they may be merged with the general resources of the Treasury. Third, 
when savings banks are allowed to make loans, they can charge interest 
rates commensurate with the current money market rates; such rates 
are almost invariably higher than the interest rates which Governments 
"peky on funds transmitted to the Treasury; the savings banks thus ... 
can afford to offer larger financial incentives to savers." (United 
Nations Secretariat, 1975: 14, 15). 
In so far as this recommendation pertains to Post Office Savings - • 
Banks I disagree with it and shall explain why. First, however, I take issue 
with the above-quoted comments of Jucker-Fleetwood and Furness. 
Both Jucker-Fleetwood and Furness appear to ignore an important 
general principle' in view of the objectives that motivate the development 
of financial institutions in U.D.C.s an institution's performance cannot 
be evaluated in isolation. Competition may sometimes be healthy (indeed, 
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creative) but in U.D.C.s with scarce resources including a scarcity of 
banking skills unquestioning encouragement of competition in all sectors 
is wasteful. If it transpires that emerging institutions complement 
each other, or that one regularly "competes away" a certain type of 
business from the other, this is not necessarily a reason for modifying 
the operations of the latter. Time series data for single institutions 
must be treated with caution. The apparently poor performance of Post 
Office Savings Banks may be partly explained by the expansion of other 
institutions such as commercial banks which are better adapted to meeting the 
requirements of depositors who might otherwise continue to use this Post Office 
facility. It may also be partly explained by the identification by 
potential depositors of alternative uses for their funds: for example, 
following the expansion of cash-cropping and increased monetization of 
African economies, direct plough-back into farming or investment in trade 
as well as payment of school fees, matching inflated bride-wealth requirements 
and purchase of consumer durables. The last may represent consumption outlays 
but unless governments have clear perceptions of target consumption standards 
and consistently enforce ceil ings to these targets, it is not automatically 
clear that such purchases by the relatively poor should be regarded as 
an uhe sirable alternative to institutional savings. 
Post Office Saving Banks have certain clear merits as savings 
institutions; these are their coverage, particularly their extension into 
the rural sector combined with their readiness to accept small deposits, 
and their reliability. Other national institutions have either not yet 
achieved the same coverage (e.g. other savings banks) or, if they have 
(e.g. cooperatives) have not the same degree of reliability. Marguerite 
Jellicoe captured rural savers• attitudes to Post Office Savings Banks 
when she wrote: 
"Where there are post offices these are still popular in rural 
areas, because they are always there and one knows the staff 
personally, and that they send and receive one's letters which 
usually arrive safely." (Jellicoe, 1968) 
By way of illustration I cite the regulations of the Post Office 
Savings Bank in Uganda as they operated in the late 1960s. 
"The minimum deposit is Shs. 5. Withdrawals of between shs. 5 and 
shs. 200 per week can be effected immediately, withdrawals of more than shs. 
200 must be sanctioned by the chief administration; the rate of interest 
amounts to 3% per annum.t; (Hubner, 1973: 106) 
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Although there have been examples of declining Post Office Savings 
Banks, this experience is not universal. Indeed in Nigeria deposits have 
apparently risen since 1971 to N£4.6 million in 1974 (Nigeria Government 
1975). In Kenya withdrawals from the Post Office Savings Bank exceeded 
deposits from 1962 to 1968 inclusive but from 1969 to 1974 (the latest 
date for which figures are available) the trend has been reversed: deposits 
have exceeded withdrawals. By 1972 total assets and liabilities exceeded 
the 1962 level (in current terms) and by 1974 they had increased a further 
27 per cent (Kenya Government, 1972 and 1975). In Zambia also there has 
been a substantial expansion of deposits (see Table 1). 
Table 1 Zambia Post Office, Savings Bank/National Savings and Credit Bank* 
Date Balance due to depositors (K,000) 
1963 4,924 
1964 5,440 
1965 5,926 
1966 •- 6,306 
1967 7,320 
1968 7,751 
1969 7,895 
1970 8,307 
1971 9,335 
1972 10,549 
1973 11,539 
1974 13,498 
* The bank was renamed in the early 1970s. 
Source: Zambia Government, Monthly Digest of Statistics. 
What we are probably observing in the case of Post Office Savings 
Banks in Africa is, firstly, an unusually high turnover of depositors. 
This in turn is a function of the very nature of the service that these 
banks provide. For most users j_s their first institutional saving 
experience. For many of these people the period when they use the Post 
Office Savings Bank is followed by another in which either it becomes 
more convenient and/or more profitable to use the facilities of a commercial-
bank or they fall upon hard times (e.g. unemployment). In either case they 
may withdraw their accumulated savings. 
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The recent Kenyan experience of rising total deposits has itself 
be©n accompanied by rising annual deposits and withdrawals. The fact 
that total deposits have risen from 1969 to 1974 may be explained by three 
phenomena. 
1. The expansion of cash cropping and monetisation of the rural sector 
has led in some areas to the emergence of prosperous peasants making 
greater use of the Post Office Savings Bank. 
2. There has been a rise in the number of low and lower-middle level 
wage and salary earners who wish to save but do not have sufficient funds 
to open a bank account (or even if they do may at first feel more secure 
using the Post Office Savings Bank). These people are often rural-based 
public sector employees. It is in the public sector that Kenyan employment 
has expanded fastest since independence and the rate of expansion rose 
markedly after 1968: there was a 55 per cent increase in African public 
sector employment from 1968 to 1974 of which only a small proportion 
represented high-level Africanisation (Kenya Government, 1975: 232). 
3. A relatively high degree of political and economic stability throughout 
the country ensured regular access to and sustained confidence in the Bank. 
A further advantage of Post Office Savings Banks is their shared 
overheads (with other post office services) which helps to keep down the 
costs of operating a large number of small accounts. 
The foregoing is not to suggest that Post Office Savings Banks have 
no disadvantages for the small saver but again I question whether the 
U.N. Secretariat has accurately identified these in suggesting that the 
key disadvantages are low interest rates and inability either to lend to 
depositors or in other ways use locally the funds deposited with them. As if 
anticipating these comments Jellicoe (1968) wrote: 
"The low rate of interest (2| per cent) on post office savings 
accounts is not important to a man with very little who would 
otherwise leave his small savings at home. The chief disincentive 
to post office saving seems to be that one has to fill in a form 
and wait whenever one wants to get any money out and under rural 
conditions one can rarely foresee when this will be." (Jellicoe, 
1968: 17). 
Carvin (1975) also emphasises the importance of safety and ease of 
withdrawal and questions the importance of interest rates as an incentive 
to rural savings. In addition for rural savers the cost of access to any 
savings institution outside the village or local market centre is a deterrent 
to use for the majority. 
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The fact that delays are involved in withdrawal does not automatically 
mean that the Post Office Savings Banks should alter their withdrawal system9 
for safety is an acknowledged advantage of this system as also is the absence 
of a direct charge to users. It is, however, worth speculating whether 
it might in any way be possible to ease the withdrawal system within the 
limits that any costs of abuse might be met by lowering interest payments 
to savers. The success or failure of such a change would depend on the rel-
ative elasticities of response. 
Essentially the role of the Post Office Banks lies in offering a 
service to small savers who are dissatisfied with, or do not have access to 
indigenous savings institution's and who do not have sufficient resources to 
establish a commercial bank account. There is still a role for Post 
Office Savings Banks as a mobilisers of small-scale savings and as offering 
a first step in banking experience for low income earners. The relatively 
extensive rural coverage of the Banks is an important feature of this. The 
question that must still be confronted .is whether there is scope for other 
institutions also to operate at the lower end of the income distribution 
offering a package of services different from those of the Post Office 
Savings Banks but to people many of whom may be in the same income range, 
(iii) Cooperative thrift and credit societies. 
The United Nations Secretariat (1975) reports that by 1972 savings 
and credit cooperatives operated in twenty-one African countries, had 316,000 
members and aggregate shares and deposits worth $13.9 million (op.cit.: 15). 
Most of these cooperatives were affiliated to the African Cooperative Savings 
and Credit Association (ACOSCA). Table 2 summarises the expansion of savings 
mobilised by ACOSCA affiliates from 1970 to 1974. During this period half 
the total expansion was recorded in one country: Kenya: while a large share 
of the remainder was recorded in Zambia followed by Ghana. In Nigeria 
savings first declined, then returned to their 1970 level. In several other 
countries they fell over the period as a whole. This suggests that there may 
be certain specific conditions that are conducive to expansion of cooperative 
savings. With a view to identifying these we begin by examining the Kenyan case. 
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In Kenya credit union savings grew substantially from 1970 to 1974. 
By the end of 1974 there were 155 societies with a membership of 83,000. 
These were mostly urban and mostly in Nairobi. There had been serious 
management and default problems but by 1974 most of the societies operated 
on a check-off system thus ensuring both regular savings and loan repayments. 
The Kenya Government stated in 1970: 
"The encouragement of thrift among the salaried community 
and the accumulation of saving through savings and credit co-
operatives can make a significant contribution towards providing 
local development capital and thereby reduce the need for 
borrowings from outside the country. Also, these societies 
provide soft consumer loans to members and help to train them 
in the basic principles of money and its proper use. The current 
countrywide programme for the promotion of savings and credit 
societies among the salaried communities in both the public and 
private sectors is now being given priority over most other 
aspects of co-operative developments" (Kenya Government, 1970: 48). 
In 1971 J.K. Muthama (Commissioner for Cooperative Development) stated 
that a prime government aim was to include workers in all government departments, 
workers in city and municipal councils and school teachers. 
The Kenya strategy mobilised $10 million in four years. Key features 
of its success were the emphasis on urban workers, on government employees 
and on the check-off system combined with strong government backing. If we take 
TABLE 2 
SAVL'iGS (SHARES Arm DEPOSITS) 
or AC COCA'S AFFILIATE? FOP. Till: ECnOTi 
1970 - 1594- , ^ , , r . (current U.S. dollar values) 
Country 1970 1971 
% age 
Increase 1972 Inorcase 
1 1 
1973 
55 n(;c 
Increase 1974 
7: 
Incxfioso 
'Jo cf 
Average ar.-ual 
Camcsocn 82, 700 271,158 228.0 571,443 110.7 890,555 55.3 1 733,708 95.2 122 A 
Dahomey - - - - - -
Ethiopia 299,852 649,414 116.6 515,010 -20.7 722,970 40.1 627,752 -13.7 30.8 
Ghana 938,725 1,020,887 32.5 1,242,000 21.7 2,764,233 172.6 3 097,103 12.0 47.2 
Kenya 770,962 1,162,246 50.8 2,314,837 99.2 4,575,266 97.6 11 o n , 571 160.0 101.4 
Lesotho 355,455 389,S42 9.6 463,669 19.0 506,428 9.2 505,428 - 9.5 
Liberia 69,753 100,379 43.9 119,365 18.9 212,613 78.1 370,942 74.£ 53.5 
Malawi - - - 188 - 6,703 * -
Mauritius 11,800 18,778 S9.1 21.CC0 11.8 30,326 44.4 27,315 -9 .5 26.3 
Nigeria 5,877,300 3,543,985 -39.7 3,627,513 2.4 5,652,671 55.S S ,652,671 - 4.7 
Senegal - 19,264 - 28,000 45.3 22,711 -18.9 20,620 -9.2 4.3 
Sierra Leone 28,874 28,874 - 683,000 - 683,000 - 683,000 - -
Swaziland - - 7,800 - 7,SCO - 44,923 * -
Tanzania 705,438 1,184,223 67.8 1,350,000 ' 14.0 2,008,198 43.8 1 149,583 -42.0 21.9 
Togo - - 1,367 - 9,465 - 3,608 - -
Uganda 209,996 709,996 - 705,000 236.0 1,612,280 128.7 1 612.230 - 91.2 
Upper Volta - - 8,400 - 6,S00 -19.0 - - -
Zambia 539,155 790,776 46.7 1,327.038 67.8 3,955,639 158.1 4 030,000 1.9 7c .5 
TOTALS: 5,940,522 9,3S9,552 -S.5 12,985,442 38.3 23,562,133 £2.2 31 560,332 33.3 37.1 
•roin: ACOSCA 5-year development plan 1976-1980. 
Published by ACOSCA, P.O.B. us?7R Nairobi, n.d. 
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three other relatively urbanised countries listed in Table 3, 
Ghana, Nigeria and Zambia we find that Zambia and Ghana rank second and third 
in terms of cooperative savings expansion 1970 to 1974. Nigeria, on the other 
hand, experienced particular problems. Not only does she have successful 
indigenous savings and credit societies with which the thrift and credit 
cooperatives must compete, but she did not have the strong government backing 
for cooperatives savings expansion that existed in Kenya. Until 1976 the 
cooperative movement was the responsibility of the Minister of Labour in the 
Federal Government, while region promotion was not helped by periodic redrawing 
of state boundaries. 
Kenya, Nigeria and Zambia are the only countries which had mobilised 
over £2 million through savings cooperatives in 1974. In no case, however, do 
the cooperatives yet rank above the Post Office Savings Bank as mobilisers of 
funds despite, in Kenya at least, their strong government backing. And in no 
case do they have significant rural coverage. 
No detailed data are available on the use of the loans which these 
societies make from their savings. Since we noted at the outset that the 
development impact of savings depends on their use we should note two points. 
First a number of the loans appear to be for consumption by people who are 
not desperately poor. Second many societies augment the funds available for 
lending by bank borrowing; in so far as this credit also finances consumption 
it is being diverted from other potentially productive uses. We should also 
note that rural sector coverage by the ACOSCA affiliated societies is minimal. 
An important issue in assessing the cooperatives' impact is what 
are one's success criteria: short-term expansion rates, national impact on 
development or speculation concerning long-term prospects? Relative success 
in savings mobilisation in one country out of twenty-one is insufficient 
evidence to claim clear success for cooperative thrift and credit in contribu-
ting to economic growth or to improving the status of the poor in Africa. 
Throughout the 1960s much was expected of the cooperative movement 
in Africa but, as documented by UNRISD, its achievements were often dis-
appointing (UNRISD, 1971 and 1972). While the marketing cooperatives spread 
rapidly, often with strong government backing, their management was the 
subject of frequent criticism. 
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Before trying to explain the somewhat disappointing results so 
far of cooperative savings particularly in the rural sector, let us examine 
the apparent advantages of thrift and credit cooperatives as mobilisers of 
personal savings. 
The first step of the argument is similar to one put forward in 
favour of Post Office Savings Banks. In this case the full argument is as 
follows. The commercial banks do not meet the needs of the mass of the lower 
income, predominantly rural population in Africa. The Post Office Savings 
Banks are not expanding their deposits. Anthropologists, administrators and 
others have commented on the quite impressive surplus often produced in rural 
areas claiming it is either hoarded or in other ways used unproductively. The 
experience of Currency Boards and Central Banks at the time of new note issues 
is also said to bear witness to this fact. Where savings are accumulated in 
the form of livestock this may lead to overgrazing. At the same time many 
peasant farmers in Africa face periodic or persistent capital shortages. The 
ideal solution appears to be the establishment of local-level savings and 
credit, institutions. Arguably people would be more willing to deposit funds 
with with such institutions if they could see that the funds were being used 
to local benefit and indeed that they themselves might be able to obtain credit. 
The argument appears strong. Furthermore in at least one case, in 
Kenya, a higher interest payment has been offered on cooperative saving deposits 
than by either the commercial banks or the Post Office Savings Bank, a significant 
point if rural savers are, after all, responsive to interest rates (Von Pischke, 
1972). Thrift and credit societies generally accept deposits well below the 
minimum deposit requirement of commercial banks. Their small membership means 
that it is in principle possible to establish .large numbers of such societies 
throughout the rural sector of any African country (as well as in low income 
areas of the urban sector) thus making this means of saving widely accessible. 
Overhead and operating costs can be kept low by using simple buildings (sometimes 
just a room loaned from or shared with a cooperative marketing society) and by 
electing the officials of the society from among its members to act on a 
voluntary basis. Where the manager is paid this can be done at a rate commen-
surate with local incomes rather than the salary of a bank clerk working for 
a commercial bank. In some cases the only fixed cost incurred by the societies 
may be the purchase of a safe. Where thrift and credit cooperatives operate 
in association with marketing societies crop payments may be automatically 
credited to their accounts. Whether or not they are amalgamated with marketing 
cooperatives the thrift societies represent voluntary associations of individuals 
come together with a common purpose and in their own interest. 
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By the late 1960s results had not matched expectations. Jellicoe 
(1968) reports quite insignificant mobilisation of savings by savings cooperatives 
in Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania and Ethiopia by the late 1960s. Of 35 savings 
cooperatives established in Uganda in the 1950s 32 remained in 1965, with accumu-
lated deposits amounting to U£30,000 (Ubner, 19 73). In Kenya 62 CUNA-type 
credit unions, chiefly in urhan areas, had accumulated savings of K£75,000 by 
1967. In Tanzania CUNA-type credit unions expanded rapidly in numbers in the 
mid-1960s. By 1967 there were 175 registered unions with savings of T£100,000 
(Jellicoe, 1968). These sums are trivial compared with the deposits mobilised 
by the commercial banks. They are small also as compared with those mobilised 
by the Post Office Savings Banks. 
We have already noted the exceptional 1970s urban-based expansion 
in Kenya and the preconditions for it. But in Uganda and Tanzania subsequent 
expansion was much less marked. In the rural sector little happened. Again 
there appears to have been one exception in Ruanda where the Bangues Populaires 
introduced in 1974 which are effectively rural cooperative thrift and credit 
societies^ made a quite substantial initial impact. The first societies were 
established in the main cash crop producing areas where there was no institutional 
competition for savings: the commercial Bank of Kigali has only five up-country 
branches and there is no Post Office Savings Bank. In the first year about 25 
o 
societies mobilised $500,000 with average deposits of $100 per head but even 
here the preconditions while good for the first societies are not so favourable 
for the further expansion of the movement. Much of the rest of Ruanda is far 
less prosperous: the crucial preconditions of lack of institutional competition 
and surplus income do not exist. 
So what went wrong? Why did the cooperative movement, for which 
such high hopes were, and sometimes still are held (e.g. in Kenya: Von Pischke, 
1972) fail to mobilise substantial savings? It is impossible to give a definitive 
answer but one may suggest one. Three prerequisites of savings institutions for 
low income groups emphasised in the discussion of Post Office Savings Banks were 
accessibility, reliability and ease of withdrawal. In addition a number of 
writers have emphas lsed the importance to potential savers of confidentiality. 
The savings cooperatives have largely failed to date on the second count. 
Undoubtedly the single most important failing of the cooperative 
movement in Africa to date has been the quality of its management. Independent 
L. Their constitutions provide for local people to elect from those who 
rish to participate a board of directors, whose members work on a voluntary basis. 
Source B. Pr£fol, personal communication. 
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studies and government reports on the cooperative movement both emphasise this. 
The problem has been that what appeared to be some of the merits of the 
cooperative movement have in fact caused this weakness. Small groups (usually 
150 to 1000) of poor individuals, most of them illiterate, cannot afford to 
employ a manager to run their society at anything but very low pay. While 
some managers are dedicated to their work and do an excellent job, the system 
has characteristics which may be expected to lead to quite frequent examples 
of incompetent management and abuse, particularly in communities which are 
inegalitarian, and in which high value is attached to individual economic achieve-
ment. Such societies cannot afford to recruit experienced and well-qualified 
managers, nor to offer much chance if any of future income increases or promotion: 
the broader the base of the pyramid in the cooperative movement, the poorer 
promotion prospects. For an ambitious, individualistic young society manager, 
anxious to improve his economic status, there are strong temptations to abuse 
his position either through engaging in other income earning activities to the 
neglect of society sork' or through misappropriation or other abuses in the dis-
position of society funds. At the same time., unless not merely the society 
committee (who may also abuse their office in disposing of funds) but also a 
substantial proportion of the ordinary members are literate the checks on abuse 
are very weak. 
In such circumstances the. common response to poor management, which 
is to recommend increased government supervision and training, can never fully 
resolve the problem. This response leads to increased government subsidy (and 
social cost) for a movement which, in Africa, has been largely imposed from 
above with a centrally determined cluster of characteristics which mush 
inevitably in many cases make it non-viable. Undoubtedly there are some success 
stories, but these are dependent on a small group of individuals and when these 
individuals leave their societies or lose their commitment there are inadequate 
safeguards to ensure the on-going viability of the societies. There is no way 
of introducing such safeguards from above. If the members cannot generate them, 
then the societies will collapse. After a good start this can happen in one 
or two years. 
Westergaard (1970) suggests paying management to be more efficient 
by offering lucrative bonuses based on the annual Surplus. Since many societies 
cannot generate a significant surplus (see e.g. Hunt 1975: chapter 5) it is 
difficult to foresee this having much effect. In fact in some areas thrift and 
credit societies are unlikely to be able to pay the manager out of their own 
revenue even if they want to. Table 3 summarises the operating costs of a Ugandan 
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credit society. There are no overheads. All funds were lent to members (in 
1966)'at 12 per cent per annum interest, and most funds lent were borrowed 
from a bank at 7 per cent. For our purposes let us imagine they were borrowed 
from members. The table reveals a substantial loss which in this case was met 
from the crop marketing proceeds of the same society. Only if the. society had 
paid no interest on funds borrowed would it have broken even paying the manager 
£5 a month. In this case the society had about 200 members and lent to 46. It 
is difficult to conceive of the same members generating deposits large enough 
to finance all loans (this was a moderately well-off coffee producing area) 
certainly for a number of years. Yet only by on-lending low-cost funds can 
societies raise the revenue needed to cover their costs. 
TABLE 3. UGANDA CO-OPERATIVE CREDIT SCHEME BUDGET FOR A 
TYPICAL PRIMARY SOCIETY 
Item Shillings 
1. Costs: Transport .. .. .. .. .. .. 180 
Stationery .. .. .. .. .. .. 150 
Manager's salary .. .. .. .. • .. 1,200 
Total 1,530 
2. Revenue: Interest received over 10 months on 
Shs. 14,000 at 5 per cent p.a. .. .. 5 83 
Interest received over 10 months on 
Shs. 2,135 at 12 per cent p.a. .. .. 214 
Total 797 
1 Bank loan. 
2 Society's own funds. 
Source: Files of Kyanamukaka Growers' Co-operative Society Limited, cited 
in Hunt, 1975. 
In addition to management quality other factors contribute to the 
non-viability of savings cooperatives: they stand a better chance of success 
in relatively prosperous areas inadequately served by other savings institutions 
(e.g. fairly remote areas producing high value cash-crops). But usually it is 
in prosperous areas that other institutions and voluntary associations are most 
active. 
Since savings cooperatives have so far failed to attract the mass 
>f the African population there is no way of demonstrating whether the hypothesis 
hat there are large sums of untapped savings in Africa's rural areas is true or 
alse. There are however reasons to suppose this claim has been exaggerated. We 
ay conceive (albeit crudely) of Africa's rural areas falling into three categories 
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pastoral, semi-arid agricultural, and well-watered, fertile agricultural. In 
the first the population is generally mobile, accumulates savings in the form 
of livestock and has displayed virtually no interest in accumulating monetary 
savings. Savings in livestock grow over time, can be transmulating monetary 
savings. Savings in livestock grow over time, can be transmuted to cash if 
necessary at the will of the owner and directly help to meet the consumption 
needs of the owner in times of adversity (e.g. drought). In semi-arid areas 
people often simply do not have a significant surplus which might be deposited 
in a savings institution. In well-watered, fertile areas on the other hand 
there is most likely to be a number of other institutions and voluntary associations 
engaged in mobilising savings. Usually only in relatively isolated areas (e.g. 
Ruanda before the introduction of the Banques Populaires in 1974) is this not 
the case. 
Some writers cite the expansion of cash-cropping without use of 
credit to support their contention that substantial unmobilised savings 
exist in the rural sector (e.g. Heyer, 1976). But stated so simply this 
argument ignores the following points. 
(a) these innovations were often very low-cost: for example the establishment 
of robusta coffee in Uganda (Hunt, 1975, chapter 2) 
b where some help was needed with costs kin might help (Hunt, 
1975, chapter 6) 
c where innovations were more costly their' adoption was either 
confined to the relatively wealthy and/or based on credit. 
d some savings that can be mobilised in rural areas to establish 
apparently profitable innovations.are available in a latent 
form: that is as family labour which' would not be exerted on 
a regular basis over and above existing productive activity 
but which people are prepared to exert on a once-for-all basis 
(clearing bush, constructing buildings and fencing, planting 
tree crops, or earning cash to finance necessary purchases) 
in the anticipation of future gain. 
It was claimed that one advantage of thrift and credit societies 
was that people would be able to see their funds being put to local use (for the 
development of their area). In fact it is no easier to ensure that co-operative 
Society loans are used to finance production than it is to ensure that 
commercial bank loans are. In the writer's experience in Uganda, group pressure 
was certainly not exerted to influence loan use (Hunt, 19 75, chapter 5). The 
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one apparent safe-guard that can be used by any lending institution is 
provision of credit in kind, but this is open to abuse by either resale of 
the items or borrowing for purposes that would otherwise have been self-
financed thereby releasing own funds for other uses. 
So far the cooperative movement in Africa has established that 
it is possible to devise structures for local level savings mobilisation but 
has not met with conspicuous success in mobilising them. This is not to 
deny that there have been pockets of success. In view of the foregoing however,, 
and in view of the apparently greater success of voluntary savings associations 
m providing the initiative and flexibility needed for local savings mobilisation 
(see below) I would recommend the following: 
Government Ministries and Departments of Cooperatives should reduce 
their supervisory role vis a vis. savings cooperatives: This is.costly and not 
conspicuous successful. Instead they should emphasise publicity through the 
media and through talks in the countryside, and the provision of advice,. They 
should be aware that they stand the greatest chance of success in establishing 
urban based cooperatives for public employees using the check-off system. 
Here people can be grouped by job and work location which should make group 
commitment and participation easier, while use of the check-off inhibits abuse. 
In area where a large number of cooperative societies have been established a 
local cooperative office staffed by a secondary school leaver with a year's 
training in accountancy and in the cooperative movement should be established. 
This person should be available to offer advice"®" and accounting services when 
requested both to registered cooperative thrift and credit socitles and other 
voluntary savings organisations. He/She should be provided with transport to 
make it possible to serve a rural area, and should be expected to cover a quite 
large range of societies. 
where thrift and credit societies operate in association with 
marketing societies the accounts should be distinct with separate membershio 
lists. Given the extent and importance of the marketing societies in some 
countries it seems inevitable that quite close supervision of these organisations 
which have been largely imposed from above, should continue. But while 
governments have various ways of enforcing compulsory savings in the rural 
sector, for instance through crop pricing, in so far as we are concerned here 
with a situation of choice, supervision should not be imposed. Advice should 
1. E.G. on a model constitution 
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be offered when requested. The experience of voluntary organisations shows 
that people often can and do establish organisations that protect themselves 
from the abuses described above, and that they learn through their own 
mistakes. The plethora of voluntary savings organisations in much of Africa 
is testimony to the resilience of the idea of local savings organisations 
although it is equally true that individuals after experiencing failure may 
be temporarily discouraged (and subsequently more cautious). 
Savings Banks 
Although examples are reported in Anglophone Africa (Cauvin, 1975) 
savings banks are more common ii\ the Francophone countries. Whereas cooperative 
thrift societies have certain similarities in terms of organisation with 
voluntary savings associations, the savings banks have certain organisational 
similarities with the time and savings deposits section of the commercial banks. 
This is both an advantage and a limitation. As institutions operating 
independantly with salaried staff (and often more imposing buildings than the 
cooperatives) they may command greater local respect and confidence. But since 
their savings mobilisation role is similar to the commercial banks, their 
ability to mobilise savings is limited by competition in some areas from the 
latter. 
The main rationale for establishing savings banks even in areas 
where commercial banks operate is that in contrast to the commercial banks 
they will (a) accept smaller minimum deposits 
(b) provide small-scale credit 
(c) provide credit on less security than would be acceptable to the 
commercial banks 
(d) by in some cases specialising according to the professional occupation 
of their client&le the savings banks can reduce the risks attached to small 
unsecured loans. 
Given these characteristics, the savings banks may be able to plug 
a gap between the services offered by the commercial banks and the voluntary 
associations and thrift and credit societies. Logically this makes sense primarily 
from the credit perspective. It is not clear that there is a substantial need 
for an alternative outlet for savings per se (remembering also the existence 
of Post Office Savings Banks), But people may be willing to place deposits 
with savings banks if this will provide them with access to credit which they 
could *iot otherwise obtain. The people likely to fall in this category are 
rich peasants and small businessmen. However we should note that as well as 
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cooperative credit, African governments have established a number of other 
special funds and programmes for lending particularly to "progressive" 
farmers and also to small businessmen (e.g. the Ugandan African Loans 
Fund and in Kenya theAgricultural Finance Corporation and the Industrial and 
Commercial Development Corporation). Where such funds are actively used this 
may curtail the scope for the operation of savings banks. 
In practice the existing scale of operation of the banks is limited. 
Cauvin (1975) is impressed by the Kenya Savings Bank (started in 1970) but 
provides no figures for the total deposit mobilised. Juck.er-Fleetwood (1964) reports 
that artisans in Morocco have their special credit organisations with the Caisse 
d'Epargne et de Credit and the Banque Populaire but deposits mobilised were 
relatively low. In Ruanda the Caisse d'Epargne currently operates only in 
Kigali where its Clientele consists predominantly of civil servants and the 
military. 
Preceding Institutions Compared with Other Formal and Voluntary Savings 
Institutions. 
If we wish to identify the other major mobilisers of personal 
savings in Africa apart from the commercial banks, we must look to the other 
institutions that serve the &lite and middle income groups: the insurance 
and pension funds and building societies in particular and also the finance 
companies. In 1971 the building societies in Kenya held deposits of almost 
K.£9 million (Dillon: 1972). In 1974 the net premiums of the life insurance 
companies in Kenya for life assurance and annuities were K.,£8.7 million 
(Kenya Government, 1975:172). These are many times larger than the sums raised 
through financial institutions serving small savers. 
From a development point of view a crucial question is what is 
done with the sums mobilised. Governments must decide whether they regard 
the financing of 4lite and middle-class housing and the. purchase of consumer 
durables as development priorities. So far as the insurance companies in 
Kenya are concerned, there is some evidence that about one third of their 
lending now goes to producing sectors plus real estate, other financial 
instutions, and government. Over half of this however, goes to real estate 
and the proportion of total loans going to genuine production appears to be 
still very low indeed (Kenya Government, .1975:171). The relevant information 
is summarized in table 4. 
. . 
. . 
. • ' • • • 
' j r.: • ; 
. 
- • ' . : • . ••• ! cl\ ' ••. 
. 
aa 1 J -ioncflx^ : rijsjycifij 
: 
< 
- 11 - IDS/WP 323 
Turning to the indigenous savings associations which exist in 
much of Africa, these serve a very different lower income clientele. They 
have a number of important features. Firstly, they enable us through their 
constitutions and written accounts of their activities (e.g. Jellicoe, 1968 and 
Meillascoux 1968) to establish why their members save. An important point 
that emerges from such an analysis is that the main reason why their members 
save (accumulating funds which via the banking sector can be channelled into 
the national economy) is not to finance productive investments but to mutual 
aid associations. Jellicoe quotes the following list of aims of such 
associations. 
"To help members in time of emergency such as sickness 
and death"; "to promote education and social well-being of 
of members", "to help menibers in case of death and burial; 
for education to create the idea of community feeling among 
them"; "to aid Luo in case of death or sickness and to train 
Luo to be good citizens". (Jellicoe 1968: 33). 
Jellicoe elaborates: "assistance in emergency" may include the payment of 
fines and help for those who have got into trouble due to non-
payment of taxes" (ibid.). 
Another quite important type of savings association described 
by both Jellicoe and Meillassoux is the dance association. There are also 
instances of voluntary savings associations being formed to finance house 
construction. Kikuyu women have formed such groups to finance the purchase 
of corrugated iron roofing and Jellicoe described three African housing 
associations formed in Nairobi .in the 1960's (op.cit. : 51). 
All the above suggests that the various African governments 
in encouraging the formation of thrift and credit cooperatives and savings 
banks in order to finance production are perceiving a totally different set 
of needs from those perceived by those who are expected to use these 
institutions. This is confirmed by repeated reports of the diversion of 
such credit to non-production uses (e.g. Hunt, 1975). The reasons for the 
lower priority attached to borrowing for production include as well as those 
listed on page, the absence of individual land title and high rents for land 
in much of Africa and associated with this the absence of large-scale indigenous 
money lending and indebtedness. Much of farm production capital is produced 
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in kind on the farm (seed, family labour etc.). Purchased inputs such as seed, 
fertiliser, insecticide should prove self-financing after the first seasons use 
if they are profitable. And, as stated above, there are a number of specialised 
credit programmes and agencies geared to meeting the needs of larger-scale 
and medium term agricultural borrowing. It is of interest in this regard to 
note some of the relevant characteristics of indigenous savings associations 
described in some detail by writers such as Jellicoe (1968) and Meillassoux 
(1968). These associations generally have carefully worked out constitutions 
and systems for cross-checking the use of funds which are usually deposited 
in banks and only withdrawn at specified times and for specified purposes. 
"All urban associations bank their funds in commercial bank's savings accounts. 
In Kampala different tribal organisations patronise different banks". (Jellicoe, 
1968:34). 
Again, this account of payments to an association shows how 
carefully funds may be supervised. 
"There are 42 members of our Association....people 
come up to the table and pay the money to the 
Secretary. He writes down the amount in the cash-boook. 
He then gives the cash to the Treasurer, who writes a 
duplicate receipt, one for the payer and onw which he 
gives to the Secretary who files it. All this must be done 
in public.... 
All cash must be put in a locked cashbook by the 
Treasurer who must pay it into the Bank on Monday. 
After twenty four hours the Auditor may visit him, require 
him to open the c'ashbox and demand to see the receipt 
from the bank It is true that some Treasurers have 
taken money; this is because members have not taken sufficient 
care to see that the money is banked quickly". (Officer 
of a Location Association, cited inJellicoe, 1968) 
Location Associations do not pay interest on deposits. 
I do not wish to suggest that the'voluntary associations have 
not experienced difficulties. Clearly they have particular difficulties 
associated with sustaining commitment and honesty in their elected officers. 
There are plenty of accounts of such associations folding up due to apathy, 
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abuse or simply dispersal of members. But equally dispersal of members. But 
equally there are many examples of such associations that have thrived over 
long periods, and of new ones being formed. True the associations are more 
often urban than rural based but 
Selected Policy Issues 
The preceding discussion touches on a number of policy issues 
concerning personal savings mobilisation which it is important that African 
governments should confront. These include: 
1. What in volume terms are the main sources of untapped surplus 
personal income which might be saved? Can this surplus be most 
effectively mobilised through financial institutions or through 
other means? If through financial institutions through what type 
of institution? 
2. Are financial institutions which are successful in mobilising personal 
savings equally successful in channelling them into productive 
uses? An in so far as they do channel credit into productive use, 
who benefits? 
3. Have previous policies with respect to mass savings mobilisation 
been in certain respects misguided? For example, has undue emphasis 
been given to the propositions that to be successful savings 
institutions must provide credit and must provide it for use in 
those areas and by those people from whom deposits are generated? 
4. Should the public sector through interest or in other ways 
subsidise savings institutions? 
We will briefly consider each of these issues. So far as the 
untapped surplus is concerned, the evidence seems inconyravertible that the 
bulk of this lies with the dlite: the small numbers of very rich. The 
diversification of equities and bonds markets can help to mobilise some of 
this surplus much of which either goes into real estate or, legally or illegally, 
goes abroad. However, private sector institutions which successfully mobilise 
the savings of the rich do not necessarily channel them into socially productive 
uses. When these institutions do lend to finance production they lend 
predominantly to multinationals. It is true that they also lend to governments 
but in very small quantities (government received less than 2 per cent of loans 
and advances of insurance companies in Kenya in 19 75). 
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At the lower end of the income distribution government policies 
have in the past been geared to establishing public sector institutions to 
mobilise small scale savings, in an attempt to plug what they have seen as 
the gap left by commercial banks. These attempt have met with relatively 
little success. They have attempted to impose savings motives and 
structures on people who often had other savings motives and preferred other 
structures. The consequence has been that public resources have been diverted 
to supporting at hidden cost relatively unproductive institutions. It is not 
clear that these costs have been socially justified. 
Financial institutions are both creatures of their economic 
environment and creators of it. However, independant underdeveloped economies, 
the scope for them to create is restricted by their national and international 
economic environment. Private financial institutions tend rather to perpetuate 
and accentuate existing structures. Commercial banks and other institutions 
usually facilitate rather than initiate economic change however much one might 
wish it were otherwise and however frequently one cites the example of Japanese 
bank involvement in investment financing (U.N. Secretariat, 1975:12). 
This is not to deny that governments can put pressures on 
financial institutions to modify their policies on deposits and advances. 
There are two possibilities: the first is to acquire national ownership or 
a controlling interest in the institutions. The second is to issue directives 
or use moral suasion (or the threat of nationalisation). The commercial banks 
could be requested to lower their minimum deposits by 20 per cent. Insurance 
companies as well as commercial banks could be directed to lend a specified 
proportion of their total loans to government or approved sectors of the 
private economy. Where the banks and other institutions are nationalised it 
should be possible to exert fuller control over the disposition of their 
funds. There will, however, be particular contradictions in the economy 
where financial institutions are nationally owned but industry is not. 
Governments will be divided between wishing to use the institutions to 
promote national economic development and to back indigenous enterprise on 
the one hand and continuing subserviance to multinational capital and its 
local credit requirements on the other, with the latter exerting a strong 
influence on the pattern of economic change in almost all African countries. 
None of this has much to do with the savings or credit needs of the mass of 
the African population. But without far-reaching structural changes in access 
to and control over productive resources it is frankly difficult to see how 
the types of public sector intervention in this area described earlier can 
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amount to much more than tinkering with the system with only a small 
proportion of the target population being affected and little impact 
on production. (I do not refer here to specialised credit and 
development agencies some of which, such as the Kenya Tea Development 
Authority have had a substantial impact on production: these are outside 
any terms of reference and me rit a. separate paper in themselves.) 
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Table tj 
Kenyan INSURANCE STATISTICS 
ANALYSIS O F LOANS AND ADVANCES 
A . Life Insurance* 
I D S / W P 2 3 2 
Aa at end of 
wetnuaent** 
^owiws: 
Agriculture*** 
Mining and Quarrying 
Manufacturing 
Building and Construction 
Real Estate 
Trade 
Electricity and Water Supply 
Transport, Storage and Communications 
f inancial Institutions 
Other Business 
Total . . . . . . 
ftbite Households ctc. t 
Private Households 
Non-profit making Organizations 
Total 
Total Private and Public Sector 
1970 
December 
276 
14 
21 
862 
110 
212 
132 
219 
1,570 
2,893 
I 
2,894 
4,740 
1971 
December 
436 
7 
13 
37 
2,098 
425 
240 
1,062 
3,882 
3,548 
3,348 
7,866 
1972 
December 
"Excludes loans and advances to private sector outside Kenya. 
"•Includes Central Government, Local Government and Other Public Bodies. 
•••Includes Forestry, Fishing and Wildlife. 
fProvisional. 
B . Non-Life Insurance* 
As at end of 
m 
''•'enmisnt** 
•\griculture*** 
Mining and Quarrying 
'•fanufacturing 
Building and Construction 
Rial Estate 
Trade 
ckctricity, and Water Supply 
Transport, Storage and Communications 
financial Institutions 
Business 
Total 
ft- (/^ Households etc.: 
v:vate Households 
WProfit making Organizations 
Total 
Iota! Private and Public Sector 
1970 
Decern bcr 
98 
35 
2 
63 
I 
101 
1971 
December 
246 
31 
90 
121 
54 
54 
253 
19 
19 
386 
185 
13 
5 
3,320 
225 
247 
908 
4,718 
2,394 
2,394 
7,297 
1973 
December 
331 
128 
2,535 
478 
231 
901 
4,273 
4,053 
4,053 
8,657 
1972 
December 
231 
12 
95 
56 
163 
10 
10 
404 
7— 
1973f 
December 
102 
25 
135 
91 
20 
65 
52 
388 
K£'000 
1974f 
December 
76 
296 
168 
716 
192 
2,605 
2,593 
6,570 
3,064 
3,064 
9,710 
K£'000 
25 
25 
515 
1974t 
December 
108 
21 
108 
165 
21 
315 
75 
75 
498 
Central Bank of Kenya, and Central Bureau of Statistics 
"Excludes loans and advances to private sector outside Kenya. 
"Includes Central Government, Local Government and Other Public Bodies. 
Hides Forestry, Fishing and Wildlife. 
'Provisional. 
Source Kenya Government, I97j? Statistical Abstract, p. 171. 
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